MQV
MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) is an authenticated protocol for key agreement based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. Unlike Diffie-Hellman, MQV provides protection against an active attacker. The protocol can be modified to work in an arbitrary finite group, and, in particular, elliptic curve groups, where it is known as elliptic curve MQV (ECMQV).
MQV was initially proposed by Menezes, Qu and Vanstone in 1995. It was improved with Law and Solinas in 1998. There are one-, two- and three-pass variants.
MQV is incorporated in the public-key standard IEEE P1363.
MQV is covered by patents assigned to Certicom [1].
See also
References
- Burton S. Kaliski Jr., An unknown key-share attack on the MQV key agreement protocol. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 4(3): pp275–288 (2001)
- Laurie Law, Alfred Menezes, Minghua Qu, Jerry Solinas, Scott A. Vanstone, An Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement. Des. Codes Cryptography 28(2): pp119–134 (2003)
- Peter J. Leadbitter, Nigel P. Smart: Analysis of the Insecurity of ECMQV with Partially Known Nonces. ISC 2003: pp240–251
- A. Menezes, M. Qu, and S. Vanstone, Some new key agreement protocols providing implicit authentication, Preproceedings of Workshops on Selected Areas in Cryptography (1995).
External links
- Articles on MQV and ECMQV in Certicom's newsletter Code and Cipher.